

1. The ability of the A-12 to conduct "covert" overflights is challenged by citing the special construction at [REDACTED], the shipment 25X1A of one million pounds of equipment by sea, the requirement for 15 25X1A C-130 sorties to [REDACTED] and the deployment of specially configured KC-135 tankers to the Far East. For the record, it should be noted that this approach is not unlike that used in the U-2 program wherein major construction was accomplished at numerous overseas bases, shipment of equipment overseas and USAF sorties in support of the program far exceeded those cited for the current program, and the entire project was conducted successfully for a period of four years without significant compromise of its covert nature.

2. The initial assignment of responsibility for covert overflight of hostile territory to the CIA was a Presidential decision based on the strong recommendation of the so-called Land Committee* which concluded that it was "dangerous for one of our military arms to engage directly in extensive overflight." The 1 May incident of 1960 and its aftermath provide no evidence which would indict the validity of that decision. On the contrary, the Soviets engaged in extravagant, but unsuccessful, efforts to link Powers with the military in order to strengthen their propaganda position. His documentation and identity with CIA, however,

*Project 3, Technological Capabilities Panel, Office of Defense Mobilization, Executive Office of the President

had been too well established for them to make even a superficially convincing case.

3. In the absence of an incident, whether the other country would believe it was being overflown by SAC or CIA would appear to be academic. If past experience is any indicator, the opposition will suffer such overflights in silence if they are unable to cope with them, or, in the case of the Soviets, they might submit a confidential aide memoire in protest.

4. In case of a shoot-down, the "simple declaration" by the pilot that he is CIA might not be convincing, but, as in the case of Powers, the extensive documentation and factual ^{COVER} mechanisms which have been employed for the past four years should be convincing to the most skeptical. Also, under such circumstances the difference between the SR-71 and the A-12 could be easily established.